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Thetitleofthispaperisintended
as a provocative
reference
(butfriendly)
to UrsulaCoope's recentarticle'WhyDoes Aristotle
That
ThereIs
Say
No TimeWithout
which
much
of
the
Change?',
provides
impetusforthe
For
in
thisquestion
present
paper.1 although
Coope'sstrategy answering
is admirable,and althoughI thinkthathercriticisms
of thestandard
oftheargument
thatopensPhysics
IV 11hittheirmark,I
interpretation
believethatherown interpretation
failsand thatsomething
ratherlike
the standardinterpretation
is correct.In the firstsection,I rehearse
ofthestandardinterpretation
and critically
evaluate
Coope's treatment
heralternative
toit.In thesecondsection,I presentan interpretation
of
theargument
thatseemstometosucceedwheretheothersfailand also
to holdthepromiseofbeingquitefruitful
in reconstructing
therestof
Aristotle's
While
a
such
reconstruction
lies
well
temporal
theory.
beyond
thescopeofthispaper,I shallconcludebymentioning
a fewofthemore
significant
pointsthatfalloutoftheinterpretation
developedhere.
I

Two Schools
FleshingOut theArgument:

Aristotle's
constructive
accountoftimebeginsin Physics
IV 11,which
with
a
of
whose
relation
to
one
anotheris
opens
hotchpotch arguments
notimmediately
evident.His first
moveis to qualifytwoarguments
in

1 UrsulaCoope,'WhyDoes Aristotle
SayThatThereIs No TimeWithout
Change?',
Proceedings
oftheAristotelian
Society101 (2001) 359-67
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IV 10againstidentifying
timewithchangebyconcedingthattimedoes
notexistwithoutchange(Aliamenoudraneuge metaboïés,
218b21).He
whatappearstobe an argument
thenoffers
fortheconcessionand then
at218b33.Thesolepremiseoffered
insupportof
restates
theconclusion
theconclusion,so it seems,is theobservation
thatwe perceivetime
wheneverwe perceivechange,but neverwhen we don't perceive
Tidiedup a bit,thisargument
runsas follows:
change.2
A (218b21-19al)
Argument
1. We perceivetimewhen,butonlywhen,we perceivechange.
2. Therefore,
timedoes notexistwithoutchange.
announcesthatwe musttakethisconclusionas thestarting
Aristotle
and
whattimehastodo with
precisely
point thatourtaskis todetermine
motionand change(219a2-3),strongly
thathe imaginesthat
suggesting
is moreorlesscompleteas stated.
theargument
Al Whyshouldwe regardit as
Whatare we to makeofArgument
valid(ifindeeditis intendedtobe deductive)?
Aristotle
Unfortunately,
how he intendstheargument
to
is oflittlehelp;ratherthanexplaining
anecdotalevidenceforthetruthofthepremise.
work,he simplyoffers
In supportoftheclaimthatperceiving
changeis a necessarycondition
forperceivingtime(one halfof thepremise,construedas a bicondia legendaccording
he recounts
towhichsickindividualswould
tional),3
for
treatment
followed
to
Sardinia
by a five-dayperiodof sleep.4
go
Becausetheydo notnoticeanything
goingon aroundthemwhilethey
becausetheyemergefromtheirlongslumareasleep(and,presumably,
berdisoriented,
perhapsunawareeventhattheyhavebeensleeping),it
doesn'toccurtothemthatanytimehas passedwithouttheirnotice(ou
Thesleepers'connectup theformer
dokei... gegonenai
chronos,
218b21-7).
what'sbetween
nowwiththelaternow and makethemone,removing
forfailingto perceiveit' (218b25-7).So noticingchangeseemsto be
thepassageoftime.
fornoticing
necessary

2 DespiteAristotle's
diverseterminology
kinesis,
(metaboïé,
phora),I shall follow
ofchange.
Coope'slead inspeakingprimarily
tothisclaim
thispaperignorecertain
technicalities
3 I shallthroughout
byreferring
andtoitspartsas conditionals.
as a biconditional
4 Cf.W.D.Ross,Aristotle's
Clarendon1936),597.
(Oxford:
Physics
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does notofferanyjustification
forthe
enough,Aristotle
Strangely
otherhalfof ArgumentA's premiseuntilafterhe has restatedthe
conclusion.
This,as we shallsee,isjustonewayinwhichthe
argument's
oftheopeningpassagesofIV 11 is a muddle.
structure
argumentative
firstillustration
carries
At anyrate,thedrowsyimageryofAristotle's
overintothesecond,whichis supposedtoconvinceus thatperceiving
forperceiving
time:
changeis sufficient
but
[F]orevenifitis darkand we arenotsubjecttobodilysensations,
seemsthatsome
somesortofchangeoccursinthesoul,itimmediately
timehas also passed.(219a4-6)

theseillustrations
Whileonemightquestionwhether
reallydo estabthe
claim
is plausible
lish the truthof the premiseof Argument
A,
do
not
entertain
the
we
consciously
proposienough.Granted, typically
we attendtosomeparticular
tionthattimeis passingwhenever
change,
are disposedto say thattimepasses wheneverwe
but we certainly
witnesschange,and no saneperson(orso onemightthink)wouldever
claimthatchangecantakeplaceoutsideoftime.5
Butevenifwe arewillingtograntthetruth
ofitspremise,thelogical
A is questionable,
to say theleast.Surelythere
character
ofArgument
mustbe some logicallyadequate suppressedpremisethatwould be
But whatis it?Two schoolsof thoughthave
acceptableto Aristotle.
under
influence
ofthisproblem.
the
emerged
traditional
school
of
is oneI shallcalltheVerificationist
The
thought
and
the
likes
of
includes
RichardSorabji,
school',
SydneyShoemaker,
andEdwardHussey.6
totheverificationists,
Aristotle
is comAccording
mittedto thefollowing
ofimpersuppressedpremise:anypostulation
intervals
is false(orperhapsevenmeaningless).7
Ifwe
ceptibletemporal
A so as to implytheclaimthatany
construethepremiseofArgument

5 Theparenthetical
own viewon thematter.
He
hedgemakesroomforAristotle's
inPhIV 14thatchangewouldexistwithout
maintains
time,weretherenocounting
I shallsaymoreon thisbelow.
souls(223a21-9).
6 SydneyShoemaker,
Time Without
66 (1969)363-81;
Change',Journal
ofPhilosophy
andtheContinuum
RichardSorabji,Time,Creation,
(Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversity
Press1983);EdwardHussey,Aristotle's
Books
III andIV (Oxford:
Clarendon
Physics,
Press1983)
7 Cf.Sorabji,75.
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temporalintervalfreeof change(such as theremightbe) would be
thenthe suppliedverificationist
premiselicensesthe
imperceptible,
Time
conclusionthattheresimplyaren'tanysuchchangelessintervals.
does notexistwithoutchange.
is thatitrenders
half
tothisinterpretation
objection
Coope'sprincipal
A superfluous.
Thesuppliedverificationist
ofthepremiseofArgument
premiseneedsjusttheclaimthatwe perceivetimeonlywhenwe perceive
changeto justifythe conclusion;why,then,would Aristotlebother
we perceivechange?Theclaim
claimingthatwe perceivetimewhenever
were
offas a simpleinfelicity
couldmoreeasilybe written
ofsufficiency
the
biconditional
after
itnotforthefactthatAristotle
repeats
restating
A (219a3-4).The verificationist
therefore
theconclusionof Argument
eitherfailsto perceivethe
to theview thatAristotle
seemscommitted
topoint
or
hesimplyneglects
nature
of
the
claim,
sufficiency
superfluous
that
this
is an
maintains
outthatitis superfluous.
(360-1)
Coope rightly
alterand thatan otherwise
undesirable
commitment,
equallyplausible
thataccountedforbothhalvesofthebiconditional
nativeinterpretation
wouldbe farpreferable.
An additionalobjectionto theverificationist
readingpointsup the
the
verificationist
of
premisetoArispeculiarity attributing suppressed
to
have
verificationwe
take
Aristotle
should
totleinthefirst
place.Why
ist leaningsin connectionwithtimewhen he seems to have them
reasonto attribute
nowhereelse?In theabsenceofsomeindependent
such a view to Aristotle(and theverificationists
providenone),8the
movelooksad hoc.
seekstoevade
thatCooperecommends
Thealternative
interpretation
fortheotherschool
andservesas thetouchstone
bothoftheseobjections
whichI shallcall the'Owenianschool'.Coope takesArisofthought,
attheopeningofIV 11toemploya methodhe employs
totle'sargument
elsewhere,
namelythatofarguingfromappearances.As Owennotesin
as an open-textured
his famousessay,9Aristotletreats'phainomenorí

8 Strictly
speaking,thisisn'ttrue,sinceHusseylooksto IV 14 forsupportforhis
verificationist
premise(142).Coopeobjects(361)thatthiscouldn'tbe
supplemental
definiofficial
inChapter14presupposes
Aristotle's
discussion
as
the
insofar
right
A.I concur.
thesoundnessofArgument
tionoftime,andthedefinition
presupposes
de Méthode,ed. S.
9 G.E.L. Owen, 'Tithenaita Phainomena',in Aristoteet les Problèmes

de Louvain1961)
Universitaires
Mansion(Louvain:Publications
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term,so thatarguingfromappearancesmightinvolvereasoningfrom
whatthemajority
ofpeoplebelieve,
empiricalobservations,
reckoning
the acceptedusage of an important
or considering
term.Coope has
likethesecondsenseinmind:'On [Aristotle's]
view,thefact
something
thatwe makethisassumption
[sc, thatthereis no timewithoutchange]
in ourordinary
judgements
providesa primafaciegroundfortakingit
to be true'(362).The locusclassicusforAristotle's
commitment
to the
Nicomachean
Ethics
X
2:
invoked
here
is
principle
aimis notnecessarily
Thosewhoobjectthatthatatwhichall things
outhen
nonsense
Forwe saythatthat
(trié
goodaretalking
legousin).
is so (pasidokei,
taut'einai);
whicheveryone
thinks
andtheman
really
thisbeliefwillhardlyhaveanything
whoattacks
morecredible
to
maintain
instead.
(1172b36-3a2)
The principleAristotle
than
employsin thispassageis ratherstronger
the one invokedby Coope, as Aristotleindicatesthatcontradicting
commonopinionamountsto talkingnonsense,whereasCoope's interpretation
requiresonlythatdoingso is primafaciemistaken.Butso
much the betterforCoope's purposes!As she reads PhysicsIV 11,
inhislargerprogramin
Aristotle's
commitment
tothisprinciple
figures
thefollowing
Aristotle
wants
'to
set
(a)
way:
up a starting
pointforhis
...
into
time
that
time
is
inquiry
by assuming
essentiallyrelatedto
he
to
this
(362);
(b)
change'
attempts justify starting
pointby making
plausibletheclaimthattimecannotexistwithoutchangeand alsothe
claimthatchangecannotexistwithout
time(362-3);(c)theexplicit
reason
for
these
claims
is
the
observation
that
we
time
when,
provided
perceive
butonlywhen,we perceivechange(ibid.);(d) thejudgments
attending
thesenoticings
thattimecannotexistwithout
'embody'theassumptions
theprinciple
inquestion,
changeandviceversa(ibid.);(e) byemploying
theallegedfactappealedto in (d) effectively
satisfies
thedesideratum
in(b),andtherefore
servestosetup theintendedstarting
specified
point
in (a).
identified
It is item(b) thathelpstheOwenianschoolevade thefirstobjection
totheverificationist
thatAristotle
is arguing
interpretation.
Byinsisting
for
the
converse
of
the
that
conclusion
there
is no
tacitly
explicitly-stated
timewithoutchange,Coope managesto bringthesufficiency
claimof
A's premiseintothepicture.Her reasonsforattributing
the
Argument
additionalconclusiontoAristotle
is thatit'is neededforassumingthat
timeis essentially
relatedtochange'and thatparityofreasoningseems
tocommithimtoit(362-3).
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The Owenianschoolevades the secondflawin theverificationist
interpretation
by employing'a principlethatis alreadyfamiliarfrom
elsewherein Aristotle's
work'(365),ratherthanone thatlookstailormade fortheproblematic
passage. It seemsthatCoope is on firmer
tradition
congroundhere,appealingas shedoes to a well-established
one ofAristotle's
dialecticalmethods.
cerning
Now,withrespecttothefirst
point,I findCoope'scasetobe wanting.
Why,we should ask, doesn'tAristotlemake explicitthe claim that
to it?
changecannotexistwithouttime,ifhe werein factcommitted
is this:
(ina footnote)
Coope's explanation
itisbecausehewantstodrawtheformer
conclusion
[se,that
Perhaps
related
tochange]rather
thanthelatter
timeis essentially
[sc, that
relatedto time]thathe placesso muchmore
changeis essentially
isnotimewithout
thanonthe
ontheclaimthatthere
emphasis
change
without
claimthatthere
isnochange
time.(363,n.13)10
tosaythatAristotle
Itis surelyan understatement
places'moreemphasis' on theclaimthatthereis no timewithoutchange,sincehe nowhere
denies
saysthatthereis no changewithouttime.Indeed,he explicitly
theclaimthatitis impossibleforchangetoexistwithouttimeinIV 14.11
thatthereis no changewithevenprovisionally
Had Aristotle
admitted
outtime,one would have expectedhimto makesomekindofremark
itinthefinalchapterof
aboutabandoningtheidea whenhe contradicts
BookIV, buthe makesno suchremark.ThiselementoftheOwenian
strainsthetexttoitsverylimits.
school'sinterpretation
Withrespectto thesecondpoint,I do notdenythatAristotle
argues
fromappearanceselsewherein thePhysics.
However,itdoes notseem
is arguingfromappearancesattheopeningofIV 11.
tomethatAristotle
ofhowthe
To see why,we shallneedto examineCoope's specification
is employedin thiscontext:
Owenianprinciple
injudging
whether
or
is thatourpractices
view,I believe,
[Aristotle's]
abouttherelationship
haspassed
certain
nottime
assumptions
embody

toMarcCohenforhelpingmesee thatCoopeseemstouse thephrase
10 I amgrateful
relatedto'as a varianton 'is definedintermsof.
'is essentially
inconnection
withherdiscussion
ofHussey's version
11 Coopenotesthisfactherself
oftheverificationist
reading(cf.n. 8 above).
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Inmaking
between
timeandchange.
thesejudgements
we takeitfor
that
there
is
no
time
without
added)
change (362,emphasis
granted
Coope goes on to quotetwofamiliar
piecesofthetextrelevantto her
and
then
reiterates
her
position:
interpretation
itseemsthata certain
timehaspassed,a certain
Whenever
change
withit(219a7-8).
seemstohavepassedtogether
in
butthesoulseemstoremain
Whenwedonotmarkanychange
oneindivisible,
itfollows
thatwethink
there
isnotime(218b29-32).
about
thinks
thatwhenwe maketheseordinary
Aristotle
judgements
thatthere
whether
time
haspassed,
weareassuming
isnotimewithout
(362,emphasis
added)
change.
behindwhichtheallegedembodiedbelieflies
Noticethatthejudgments
as
ones
thepassageoftime.So one's
arespecified
narrowly
concerning
that
a
interval
of
time
certain
has
passedallegedlyembodies
judgment
thebeliefthatthereis no timewithoutchange.In thepassagesCoope
is expressing
thenecessity
ofperceptions
ofchangefor
cites,Aristotle
oftimeand,equivalently,
thesufficiency
theperception
ofperceptions
ofchange.How is thisinterpretation
oftimefortheperception
supposed
towork?
In orderto answerthisquestionitis first
necessaryforus to understandwhatCoope has inmindwhenshetalksaboutembodiedbeliefs:
I havespokenofbeliefs
that"liebehind"orare"embodied
in"the
But
what
it
a
we
make.
is
for
belief
to
be
in"the
"embodied
judgements
we
make?
Aristotle
is
not
that
all
we
judgements
claiming
explicitly
believethatthere
is notimewithout
time.
changeorchangewithout
His claimis onlythatthesebeliefswouldexplainand justify
the
we
make
about
whether
or
not
time
has
particular
judgements
passed.
(365,n.16)
Thebeliefthatthereis no timewithoutchange,then,is supposedtobe
and justifying
one'sjudgmentthatsomeinterval
capableofexplaining
oftimehaspassed.Butthishardlycouldbe correct.
Theembodiedbelief
is ratherbettersuitedto explainand justifythejudgmentabout the
occurrence
ofchange:
ifan agentjudgedthatsomeintervaloftimehad
then
a
beliefthattimerequireschangemight
transpired,
dispositional
welllead himtobelievethatsomechangehad also occurred.
Thisway
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withthetext
aboutthematter
accordsmuchbetter
ofthinking
certainly
oftimeto be sufficient
for
thatCoope cites,sinceit takesperceptions
of change.An analogousproblemplaguesCoope's treatperceptions
embodiedbeliefthatchangerequirestime,as she
mentoftheputatively
the
maintainsthatthisbelieflies behindour judgmentsconcerning
ofchange.12
occurrence
interThisflawcouldbe remediedsimplyenoughbysystematically
embodied
belief.
there
the
two
of
Unfortunately, are
changing
types
Forfirstofall,I thinkit's quite
otherproblemsforthisinterpretation.
thateitherourjudgments
aboutchangeorthose
tomaintain
implausible
and I also thinkthat
abouttimeare acquiredor justified
inferentially,
would have recognizedtheimplausibility.
Our beliefsabout
Aristotle
andarejustified
bothchangeandtimeariseoutofexperience
(whenthey
that
when
But
even
the
same.13
aside,
are) by
conjoined
setting worry
withheraccountoftheroleplayedby embodiedbeliefs,Coope's commitment
to the claimthatAristotlearguesfromappearancesto the
conclusionthattimerequireschangeand theconclusionthatchange
withabsurdity.
Recall:thebeliefthattime
requirestimesaddlesAristotle
the
concerning
requireschangeis allegedlyembodiedinourjudgments
passage of time,and thebeliefthatchangerequirestimeis allegedly
the occurrenceof change.14
embodiedin our judgmentsconcerning
Embodiedbeliefsare ones that'would explainand justify'thesejudgof course:each musttake an antecedent
ments.Not by themselves,
changeortimetoserveas an initialpremise.That's
concerning
judgment
Aristotle
trots
thepoint,as I understand
it,ofsayingthattheconditionals
One
some
'ourordinary
outreflect
(363).
changein
perceives
thinking'

12 AlthoughCoope does not explicitly
specifythejudgmentsas such,whenone
'theseordinary
inwhichshementions
thecontext
considers
(363),it's
judgements'
aboutchange.
clearthatshemustmeanjudgments
treatment
ofAristotle's
aboutthetraditional
13 Cf.Cooper'scomplaint
interpretation
theagent
MA:
decided
to
eat
in
EN
and
ofthepractical
chicken,
'[H]aving
syllogism
not
approachesthetable,seesthechickenand takessome- theactofperception
in
a
it
and
used
as
detached
which
is
information
a
of
were,
then,
providing piece
a linkin a
littleargument
issuingin theactofeating,butinsteaditselfforming
M.
toaction.'(John
chainleadingfromdecisionthrough
perception
psychological
Hackett1986],52)
[Indianapolis:
Cooper,ReasonandHumanGoodinAristotle
sake I hereretainCoope's pairingsof embodiedbeliefswith
14 For simplicity's
associatedjudgments.
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thatsomeinterval
oftimemusthavepassed
hissoul;hethendetermines
beliefthatchangerequirestime.
onthebasiso/hisimplicit
schemeCoope
toputitbluntly,
is thattheexplanatory
Theproblem,
the
a closedfigure.
Forunlessourjudgments
forms
sketches
concerning
If
there
is
some
for
them.
time
are
of
explanation
inexplicable,
passage
for
totheactualexplanation
theembodiedbeliefis notwhollyirrelevant
theniftheembodiedbeliefwouldexplainthejudgthesejudgments,
Thatis,tomaketheembodied
mentsabouttime,itdoesexplainthem.15
itmustbe madetobean elementintheexplanabeliefactuallyrelevant,
forone's
So partoftheexplanation
judgment.
torychainfortheexplicit
that
that
time
has
is
his
belief
changerequires
passed
implicit
believing
But that'snot the completeexplanation.Anotherpartof the
time.16
is his havingperceivedsomeepisodeofchange.So ifthe
explanation
embodiedbeliefis at all relevantto thejudgmentin question,thenthe
is formed(inpart)on thebasisofanother
judgmentconcernjudgment
of change.As I indicatedabove,thisexplanation
ing theoccurrence
thattheexplastrikes
meas specious;butbecauseCoope also maintains
is formed(inpart)
nationforone'sbelievingthatchangehas transpired
thepassage of time,the
on thebasis of anotherjudgmentconcerning
thattimehas lapsedin
trail
back
on
itself:
we
believe
explanatory loops
that
has
and we believethat
because
we
believe
change occurred,
part
changehas occurredin partbecausewe believethattimehas lapsed.
aren'tgenuineexplanations
at all,Coope is
Sincecircularexplanations
mistakenwhen she claimsthatthe two allegedlyembodiedbeliefs
timeand change.17
wouldexplainourjudgments
concerning

in thefootnote
15 As Coope herself
remarks
is saying,
above,'[Aristotle]
excerpted
thatthisis a beliefwhichexplains
andjustifies
ourjudgements'
rather,
(365,n. 16,
heretoAristotle's
accountofvoluntary
actionsin EN
emphasisadded).Sherefers
III 5,butifthereference
is intendedto illuminate
herapplication
oftheOwenian
in PhIV 11,thesubjunctive
to theargument
formulation
used earlieris
principle
weak.
unnecessarily
16 HereI employtherevisedpairingsofembodiedbeliefsand associatedjudgments,
sinceI'm attempting
tocharacterize
theexplanatory
mechanism
charitably.
17 Similarproblemsarisein connection
withCoope's claimregarding
justification,
hereonaccountofthecontroversy
surroundthoughmatters
getmorecomplicated
I thinktheforegoing
itself.
interms
framed
ingthenatureofjustification
objection
of explanationcasts sufficient
doubtupon Coope's interpretation
to motivate
a better
so I shallsetasidethisissue.
alternative,
finding
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canbe summedup quitesimply.Coope'sinterpretation
Myobjection
as arguingfromappearancesinvolvespositingexplanatory
ofAristotle
Thesemechanisms
mechanisms.
proceedfroma beliefaboutchange(or
time)and an ontologicalprincipleconcerningthe relationbetween
changeandtimetoa beliefabouttime(orchange).Butbecauseshethinks
theperceptosymmetrical
Aristotle
iscommitted
ontological
principles,
schemestandbothas explanansandexplatualbeliefsintheexplanatory
nandumtoeachother.Thisis obviouslyunsatisfactory.
Bytheprinciple
in one
ofcharity,
then,we mayconcludethatCoope mustbe mistaken
eitherAristotle
is notarguingfromappearancesat the
wayor another:
to theclaimthatchange
openingofV 11,or else he is notcommitted
cannotexistwithouttime.I shall arguethatshe is mistakenon both
counts.

II

A New Old School

rightabouttheverificationDespiteitsinadequacies,thereis something
I shall endorsebearscertain
and theinterpretation
ist interpretation,
someofthetextthatsurrounds
withit.I beginby examining
affinities
thattimedoesnotexist
initial
conclusion
A.
the
After
stating
Argument
thepointthatwe perceivechangeand
withoutchangeand reiterating
drawswhatseemstobe a morespecific
Aristotle
timetogether
(219a3-4),
A:
conclusionthanthatofArgument
B (219a2-10)
Argument
1. Timeis eitheridenticaltochangeoris someaspectofchange.
2. Timeand changearenotidentical,
(cf.218bl8.)
timeis someaspectofchange.
3. Therefore,
as thefirstpremiseat 219a8:
makestheclaimthatfunctions
Aristotle
hdsteëtoikinesisê teskinêseõsti estinho chronos.The inferentialparticle

(hoste)suggeststhatthisis a consequenceof some earlierclaim,but
he
tothemixpriortomakingthisassertion;
has addednothing
Aristotle
concomius thattimeandchangeareperceptually
hassimplyreminded
in supportofthepremiseof
tantand rehearsedhis secondillustration
maketheclaim?
A. So on whatgroundsdoes Aristotle
Argument
B is in factpartof Argument
I maintainthatArgument
A, though
thatthisis the
Aristotle
givesus preciouslittleassistanceinrecognizing
thatthefirst
case.I readtheinferential
premiseof
particleas indicating
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B is intendedsomehowtofollowfromthepremiseofArguArgument
A:
mentA. ForconsiderjusttheformofArgument
1. We perceivex when,and onlywhen,we perceivey.
x does notexistwithouty.
2. Therefore,
IfArgument
B couldbe fashionedintotheadditionalpremisesthatare
be
A's cogency,two problemswould thereby
for
required Argument
A would be made fit,and the
solved:theotherwiselame Argument
spurious'koste'would finda home.In orderto determine
apparently
B suppliestherequiredpremisesforArgument
how Argument
A, we
what
relations
between
the
values
mustaddressthefollowing
question:
above could explainthe truthof
forx and y in the argument-form
licensethecorresponding
instancesofthepremiseand simultaneously
conclusion?
Ifthesubstituends
forx and
thatdoes thejob is identity.
One relation
the
then(providedthat'perceives'is readdere)18
terms,
yarecoreferring
willbe true,and we have
instantiated
premiseofour argument-form
beforeus a verygood explanationof its truth.If Phosphorusjust is

withthe
18 Thedistinction
betweendereanddedictoperception
is nottobe confused
and kathhauto
distinction
Aristotle
drawsin deAn II 6 betweenkatasumbebëkos
Whereasthelatterdistinction
is baseduponthefeatures
ofperceptible
perception.
that
are
relative
tothefunction
ofourvariousperceptual
objects
causallyefficacious
theformer
distinction
tradesonthedifference
betweencauseandcontent.
faculties,
Forexample,color(oneofthe'properperceptibles')
and movement
(a 'common
are perceivedkathhauto,sinceour eyesare sensitiveto thesevery
perceptible')
Incontrast,
thesonofDiaresis perceived
katasutnbebëkos,
sincenoneofour
things.
faculties
is attunedspecifically
tosubstances,
letalonetomaleoffspring
perceptual
ofthisparticular
kathhautois (say)a movingwhitething
man;whatoneperceives
thatjusthappenstobe thesonofDiares.Thedistinction
betweendereanddedicto
as I conceiveit,isglimpsed
atSens446bl8-24
andcutsacross
perception,
byAristotle
thedistinction
drawnin de An II 6. Something
(whichmay,but needn'tbe a
derejustincaseitoriginates
is perceived
a causalchainthatproducesa
substance)
eventin an agent.The agentmightbe whollyignorant
oftheitem's
perceptual
character
andmight
evenfailtorecognize
italtogether.
Theonlyrequirement
isthat
thereisinfactsomething
suchthatitcontributes
sortofway)
causally(inthetypical
to an act of perception.
On theotherhand,de dictoperception
consistsin the
underwhichtheagentperceivesthe
conceptualcontentof an act ofperception
intended
item.So onemight
as a movingwhite
perceivethesonofDiaresvariously
as a man,oras theverymanthatheis.Whatoneperceives
dedictoisa moving
thing,
a man,andthesonofDiares,respectively.
whitething,
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Hesperus,thenit'sobviousboththatandwhyTheophanisperceives(de
re)Phosphorusexactlywhenhe perceivesHesperus,sincethereis but
itis also truethatPhosphorus
one objecttobe perceived.Additionally,
does notexistwithoutHesperus,sinceeachofthemis justVenus,and
canexistwithoutitself.
forx and
Hence,ifthesubstituend-pair
nothing
a
a
of
of
we
have
a viable
is
member
of
set
coextensive
terms,
y
pairs
A.
ofArgument
reconstruction
Althoughidentityrendersthe argumentviable,it cannotbe the
thatAristotle
has inmind,becausehe takeshimself
tohave
justification
in IV 10 thattimeis notidenticalwithchange(witnessthe
established
we mustlookelsewhere.19
secondpremiseofArgument
B). Therefore,
B
considersinthefirst
Thealternative
Aristotle
premiseofArgument
- sc, thattimeis some featureor aspectofchange(teskinéséõs
ti)
would certainly
go a long way towardsexplainingthe factthatwe
thefeaperceivetimeonlywhenwe perceivechange,sinceperceiving
turesofsomething
(onceagain,dere)the
plausiblyrequiresperceiving
Butsurelythereare values forx and y,wherex is some
thingitself.20
we perceivey.
ofy,and yetit'sfalsethatwe perceivex whenever
feature
Forexample,ifxisthemolarweightofsomechemicalcompoundy,there
thelatterstrictly
is nothingto guaranteethatperceiving
requiresperin
de
re
or anyothersense.
the
sense
of
the
former,
'perceiving'
ceiving
Indeed,it would be wildlyimplausibleto maintainthatanyoneever
chemicalcompoundoutside
perceivesthemolarweightofa particular
circumstances
theratherextraordinary
experipresented
bylaboratory
Somefeatures
ofperceptible
ments.21
objectsaresuchas tobe hiddenin
mostcontexts.
invitesus toconsider
Theveryfactthattherearesuch'occult'features
whethertheremightbe some thatare unmistakable,
impossibleto

ofchangewithouttimein Chapter14
thepossibility
19 Aristotle's
claimregarding
butsee n. 8 above.
additional
for
to
be
identity,
grounds rejecting
mightthought
totherelevant
inquestionbelongsexclusively
thatthefeature
20 Thisclaimpresumes
thatsomeoneshould
it'simpossible
item.Forexample,
tokenortypeofperceptible
Butmoreonthisbelow.
Calliashimself.
without
Callias'tallness
perceiving
perceive
21 I assumeherethatthemolarweightofa chemicalcompoundplaysno significant
If thisassumptionis
features.
the substance'sperceptible
role in determining
incorrect
be,forallI know),thenbymyownaccountofdereperception,
(as itmight
onecouldperceiveitsmolarweightdere.Suchworriesaside,I hopethatmypoint
formakingmeawareofthisconcern.
is clearenough.ThankstoJimHankinson
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overlook.It seemsto me thatthereare in factsuchevidentfeatures
of
objectsand thatAristotle
perceptible
mighthavejustthesein mindin
his discussionoftime,evenifhe failedto articulate
theidea clearlyin
thecontext
ofthatdiscussion.So letmebe a bitmoreprecisebygivinga
definition
ofthisnotion:
provisional
ofy iff
(EF) Foranypairofperceptibles
<x,y>,x is an evident
feature
x is a feature
ofy,and foranypercipient
z
cannot
z,
perceive(de
itsx.
dicto)ywithoutalso perceiving
Theidea hereis thattherearecertainfeatures
ofsomeitemswhichare
fail
should
one
to
be
aware
of
suchthat,
thosefeatures,
onewouldn'tbe
An exampleis thepair<volume,stone>(where
awareoftheitemitself.
by Volume' I do notmean any determinate
quantityof volume,but
If
some
volume
or
fails
other).
simply
Theophanis toperceivea particularstoneas havingvolume,itis verydifficult
indeedtofathom
howhe
couldpossiblybe awareofthestoneat all.He couldnotbe awareofthe
at anyrate,sinceperceiving
stoneas a stone,
someF-typethingas an F
the
of
the
plausiblyrequires employment
conceptofF-ness,and any
a
of
volumeless
is
not
the
Ofcourse,
object
concept
conceptofa stone.22
the stoneisn'tidenticalwithits volume,sinceit has otheressential
features(its mass,forexample).Anotherexample:<life,animalx If
failstoperceivea certain
animalas beingalive,thenhemust
Theophanis
notperceivetheanimalas an animal,sincetheconceptofan animal(on
Aristotle's
view,at any rate- cf.de Anima412bl8-29)is in partthe
conceptofa livingthing.
Thesetwoexamplesillustrate
thesignificance
ofgiving'perceives'a
dedictoreading,
forit'squitepossiblethatan individualshouldperceive
a stoneas something
otherthana stonewithoutperceiving
itas somethat
has
volume.
he
that
believes
what
he
sees is a
thing
(Perhaps
in
reflected
a
is
to
this
image mirror.)
Mypresentstrategy exploit factby
that
Aristotle
takes
the pair <time,change>to standin the
arguing

22 NotethatI amnotmakingtheimplausible
claimthatinordertoperceivea stoneas
ofwhichbeinga
such,one musthavean apperceptive
belief,partofthecontent
ofhisconceptofvolume.Thatis,oneneedn'tthink
abouthisconcept
representation
ofvolumeinordertoperceivethestoneas something
possessingvolume.Allthat
is requiredis thathisconceptplaysa roleinhisperceptual
beliefthata stonelies
beforehim.
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sincehisdoingso wouldjustify
theproblematic
evidentfeature
relation,
A: iftimeisanevidentfeature
halfofthepremiseofArgument
ofchange,
thenonewouldinfactperceivetimewheneverhe perceivedchange.
the(EF)relation
doesnotobviously
the
though,
Unfortunately,
justify
claimthatwe perceivetimeonlywhenwe perceivechange.Theproblem
constraints
on therelevant
is thatthedefinition
places no exclusivity
That
vis-à-vis
its
while
of
feature
is,
possessor.
any givenstone
type
and
a
certain
so
do
volume,
elephants eyeglasses.So whileit
possesses
that
well
be
true
one
must
he perceives
perceivevolumewhenever
may
a stoneas such,he will also perceivevolumewhenhe perceivesan
falsethathe willperceivevolume
elephantas such,and itis therefore
a
when
he
stone.
only
perceives
The solutionto thisproblemis twofold.Greatercare should be
exercisedin distinguishing
typesand tokens,and some kindof conmustbe imposedon therelevant
straint
typesinvolved.I havebeenless
in
thancautiousin constructing
myexamples,sincethepairsfiguring
in
While
and
'life'
are
terms.
Volume'
themareframed heterogeneous
usedas typetermsormass-nouns
(onehasnohesitation
verycommonly
'stone'and 'animal'areboth
touse eithertermwithoutanydeterminer),
of
moreclearlytokentermsorcount-nouns
(onespeaksindeterminately
I hope thatmy
stoneand animalonlyin ratherspecialcircumstances).
inlightofthefactthatAristotle
is rather
however,
laxitywillbe forgiven,
thanheoughttobe inhisowndiscussionofchangeandtime.
lesscareful
A (as wellas itsconclusion)treats'time'and
ThepremiseofArgument
as evidencefor
while
theillustrations
offered
as
terms,23
'change' type
thepremiseareframedin termsoftokenepisodesofchangeand interso longas one makescertain
vals oftime.The shiftis unobjectionable
members
of the typeand the
about
among
uniformity
assumptions
Aristotle
the
chosen
of
examples.
apparentlymakes
representativity
suchassumptions.
theresultWhenthe(EF) relationis recasttoaddresstheseconcerns,
feature:
an
that
of
evident
notion
is
proper
ing
(EPF) Foranypairoftype-perceptibles
<O, '|/>,O is an evident
proper
iff
token
of
of
else,
(and
'|/
''f
except
by
nothing
every
feature

buttheabsence
inAtticGreeklendstotheconfusion,
article
23 Thelackofanindefinite
tobe talking
thatAristotle
intends
indicates
of'tis'orsomeotherdeterminer
clearly
abouttimeandchangeingeneral.
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virtueitsrelationto somesuchtoken)has sometokenofO as
and foranypercipient
one ofitsfeatures,
z, z cannotperceive
itstokenO.
anytokenof''fas a ''fwithoutalso perceiving
to be foundanydefinition
be thoughttoo contrived
If theforegoing
one needonlyexaminehisdiscussionofproperties
wherein Aristotle,
ithimself.
Consider
illustrates
in TopicsV 1-3to see thathe practically
whathe saysat 131b33-6:
ofa surface
a manwhohasstatedthatitisa property
Thus,forexample,
the
to be theprimarythingthatis colored,has used [in rendering
but
in
someaddition
colored,
something
perceptible,
being
property]
estinhupard' phaneron
alwaysbelongs(toioutõ
thingwhichevidently
ofsurfacewillin thisrespecthavebeen
chonaei),and so theproperty
rendered.
correctly

thispassageindicatesthatAristotle
Givenmyterminology,
regardsthe
pair <color,surface>as fallingin theextensionof the(EPF) relation.
Colorand surfacearebothtypeseach ofwhosetokensareperceptible
hassomecolororotheras one
everysurface
(theyaretype-perceptibles);
ifanynon-surface
has color,ithas itbyvirtueofbeing
ofitsfeatures;24
coloredthings);and anyone
relatedtoa surface(theybeingtheprimary
who perceivesa surfaceas suchcannotfailto perceiveitscolor- the
whichevidently
Othercandidates
coloris 'something
alwaysbelongs'.25
fromthissectionoftheTopics:
fire>;
<ensouled,
<rarity,
livingcreature>;
In
an
each
who
fails
to perceivethe
case,
agent
liquid>.
<panmorphic,
be said toperceivethesecond
memberofthepaircannotproperly
first

24 Thesurfaces
oftransparent
substances
to
(e.g.,glassand water)mightbe thought
Aristotle
doesn'thesitate
tocommit
himself
however,
presenta specialchallenge;
arecolored(Sens437a6),andinfactitappears
totheclaimthatallbodieswhatsoever
as thoughhis theoryof visionmaintainsthatit is thesurfaceof theair at the
causeofourvisualperception
ofoureyesthatis theimmediate
ofbodies
boundary
and Sens439al7-30).
(cf.deAn419all-bl,423a21-b7,
25 As a variety
ofthe'commonperceptibles'
areperceptible
(cf.n. 18above),surfaces
correct
to say thatan agentcannot
bymeansotherthansight,so itis notstrictly
as suchwithout
itas colored.PerhapsAristotle
hasin
perceivea surface
perceiving
mindhisviewthatsightis themosthighly
developedsense(cf.deAn429a3),under
theinfluence
ofwhichone mightwellsaythattoperceivea surfacein thefullest
waypossible,onemustperceiveitas beingcolored.
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memberof thepair as such,becausede dictoperception
involvesthe
and ineachcasethefirst
ofconcepts,
memberofthepairis
employment
a perceptible
theconceptofwhichis includedintheconceptof
feature,
thesecondmember.A moregermaneexampleis thepair <distance,
drawsa tightconnection
betweenspace,change,
space>,sinceAristotle
IV II.26Thiscomparisoncutsto theheartofArisand timein Physics
and I shalltouchon itbriefly
intheconclusion.
totle'stemporaltheory,
Likeidentity,
the(EPF)relationgivesus themeanstoaccountforthe
A. For if timeis an evidentproperfeatureof
in Argument
inference
change,thenwe willperceivetimeonlywhenwe perceivechange(it's
a proper
featureof change,afterall), but also wheneverwe perceive
as
And so ifArgument
B is
feature).
change such(sinceit'san evident
takenas an argument
fortheclaimthat<time,change>is includedin
itcanbe incorporated
ofthe(EPF)relation,
theextension
intoArgument
reconstruction
is a rather
A,and theresulting
plausibleargument:
A-cum-B
Argument
1. We perceivetimewhen,and onlywhen,we perceivechange.
219a3-8)
(218b21-3,
2. Itfollowsabductively
from(1) thateither(i) changeand
(hoste)
timeare identical,or (ii) timeis an evidentproperfeatureof
forthetruthof(1) is availchange,sinceno otherexplanation
able.(Cf.219b8-9.)
3. Buttimeand changearen'tidentical.(218bl8)
4. Hence,timeis an evidentproperfeatureofchange.(From2, 3
- cf.219b9-10.)
5. If x is a properfeatureofy,thenx does notexistwithouty.
premise)
(Implicit
timedoes notexistwithoutchange.(From4, 5 6. Therefore,
218b21.)

and sinceevery
to something,
26 'Sincethatwhichmovesmovesfromsomething
is
forit'sbecausemagnitude
motionfollowsmagnitude;
is continuous,
magnitude
and it'sbecausemotionis thattimeis'
thatmotionis also continuous,
continuous
1021a29-32.
Cf.Metaph
(Ph219alO-14).
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I taketheplausibility
ofthisargument
as a markinfavorofmyinterpremarkinitsfavoras comparedtoCoope's: myinterpretation.Another
with Aristotle'sremarksthatwe
tationis much more comfortable
and
time
(hatna
together - 219a3)and thatwe perceive
perceivechange
timeimmediately
(euthus 219a6)whenwe perceivechange,sinceI claim
thattheyarerelatedobjectsofa singleactofperception,
whereasCoope
an
inference
between
the
of
(albeitunconscious)
perception
interposes
one and thejudgmentthattheothermustalso be present.Butthough
arefavorable,
therearetwosignificant
thesefeatures
myinterpretation
that
must
be
addressed
before
anygeneralclaimto itssupeobjections
be
made.
riority
may
The firstobjectionis thatmy interpretation
importsfartoo much
thatshouldhavebeenmadeexplicit
content
content
intotheargument,
I respond,first,
outthatwithouttheadded
wereitintended.
bypointing
I
and
theargument
flounders, as havetriedto showin section
content,
I, no othermeansof repairingtheargumentis satisfactory.
Second,I
thatcontent,
theargument
shouldliketonotethatevenhavingimported
trulydoesrepresent
justan openingmove,sinceknowingonlythattime
is an evidentproperfeatureofchangelogicallyentailslittlemorethan
thefactthattimecannotexistwithoutchange.The important
question
stillremains:inwhatwayis timean evidentproperfeatureofchange?
answeris thattimeis thenumberofchange.Theexplication
Aristotle's
efforts
ofthisansweroccupiesAristotle's
fortheremaining
chaptersof
BookIV. Comparethiswiththecase ofcolorsand surfaces:
one might
well be convincedthatcoloris an evidentproperfeatureof surface
withouthavinganything
likea philosophically-respectable
accountof
color.27
So I insistthatalthoughmyinterpretation
does importa good
deal of contentintotheargument,
it does not importtoo much:the
additionalcontentis needed forthe argumentto go through,
is not
unfamiliar
toAristotle,
and inno waythreatens
torendertherestofhis
discussionoftimeotiose.
The secondobjectiontakestheformofa tuquoque.I complainedin
sectionI about the adequacy of Coope's explanationforAristotle's
failureto drawexplicitly
theconclusionshe attributes
to him(sc, that

27 Notethatalthough
Aristotle
seemstomakecoloran evidentperceptible
feature
of
inTopV 3,heobviously
surface
doesnotthinkthathishavingdoneso relieveshim
oftheburdenofproviding
an accountofcolor,sincehe undertakes
theprovision
ofjustsuchan accountinSens3.
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canI giveforthefact
thereis no changewithouttime);whatexplanation
thatAristotle
claimsthatthereis no timewithoutchange,but doesn't
claimthatthereis no changewithouttime?The shortansweris that
doesn'tdefinechangein termsof time.Fleshingout thisreAristotle
and
a striking
difference
betweenmyinterpretation
sponsehighlights
thatoftheOwenianschool.
in a waytobe reasoningfromcommonsense.
Coope takesAristotle
hisprojectis philosophically
On thisreading,
naïve,sinceitproceedsby
that
we
all allegedlymake,but
certain
of
assumptions
way discovering
about whichwe were previouslyunaware.I do not shareCoope's
I do notthinkthatAristotle's
are
ofthissituation.
assessment
arguments
intendedtohelphimdiscoverwhattimeis;I thinkhe comestothetable
areintended
witha fullydevelopedviewinhandandthathisarguments
is correct.But ifAristotle's
to convincethereaderthathis definition
whatshouldprevent
are polemicalratherthanprobative,
arguments
otherelements
ofhisphilosophical
arsenal?Specifihimfromdeploying
Aristotle
the
shouldn't
exploit
sophisticatedaccountof
cally,why
in
that
the
bookofthePhysics?
and
he
motion
gives
preceding
change
him.Indeed,itseemsobvious
shouldprevent
I maintain
thatnothing
oftimeis
tome thathe musthavethisaccountin mindifhisdefinition
n.
it
the
notes
is
factthat
As Coope herself
toavoidcircularity.
(363, 12),
and actuality rather
defineschangein termsofpotentiality
Aristotle
- thatperinstantiation
thanin termsoftemporally-variant
property
as 'a numberof changewith
mitshim to definetimenoncircularly
have
and
after'.
before
to
the
I,
too,
arguedthatdespiteappearrespect
kinetic
sinceAristotle's
is notat all circular,
ances,thedefinition
theory
termsand canbe used togivea non-temis developedintemporal-free
oftime.28
poralsenseto'before'and'after'as theyappearinhisdefinition
afterrehearsing
oftimeveryshortly
unveilshis definition
Aristotle
thatopenIV 11,and yethe nowhereindicatesthathe is
thearguments
ofchangeinfavorofhisowndefiniotherconception
some
abandoning
that
he has had itin mindall along.
to
tion.We ought conclude,then,
Andifthatisso,thereisgoodreasonforhimtorejecttheideathatchange
couldnotexistwithouttime,as timedoes notfigurein thetiIn einaiof
thattimeis someproper
change.Butitstillremainsan openpossibility
featureor otherofchange,and thuscouldnotexistin itsabsence.It is

23 (2003) 301-18
28 'Aristotle'sDefinitionof Time Is Not Circular',AncientPhilosophy
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thatgetsdevelopedas Aristotle's
considered
preciselythispossibility
viewon time.
Ill Conclusion
I am advocatingis superiorbothto the
I claimthattheinterpretation
and
eventhoughmyown intertheverificationists',
Owenianschool's
pretation
logicallyentailsthelatter.On myreadingofopeningofIV 11,
feature
of
takestimetobe a ratherspecifickindofperceptible
Aristotle
Aristotlerejectstheidea of
change.Accordingto theverificationists,
is correct,
temporalintervals.But if my interpretation
imperceptible
temporalintervalswould be imperceptible
perceptible
imperceptible
and theseare obviouslyimpossible.Thus,myinterpretation
features,
entailstheverificationists'.
Still,myinterpretation
oughttobe preferred
forAristotle's
insofar
as itprovidesa substantive
overtheirs
explanation
and supportsbothhalves
ofimperceptible
temporalintervals
rejection
in thefirstpremiseof Argument
of thebiconditional
A, whereasthe
does neither.
verificationists'
as
is superiortothatoftheOwenianschoolinsofar
Myinterpretation
claimin thefirstpremise(we perceive
it makesuse ofthesufficiency
toAristotle
we perceivechange)withoutattributing
the
timewhenever
claimthatchangecannotexistwithouttime,a claimthathe explicitly
by his own accountofchange.But
rejectsin IV 14 and is unsupported
doesn'tsaddleAristotle
withan
aside fromthisfact,myinterpretation
and
of
the
of
our
beliefs
origins
justification
implausibleconception
of change,even while
about thepassage of timeand theoccurrence
is arguingfromappearances.Coope's interpreclaimingthatAristotle
buthertreatment
tativemotivesarecommendable,
oftheargument
does
notstandup toscrutiny.
I close witha briefremarkabout the possiblefruitborneby my
I said intheprevioussectionthatthereis reasontothink
interpretation.
wouldinclude<distance,space> intheextension
thatAristotle
of(EPF)
and thathe drawsa tightconnection
betweenspace,change,and time
B. Ifwe thinkaboutthematteras
aftergivingArgument
immediately
Aristotle
does, it shouldbe clearto us thatdistance,conceivedas a
is in some sense a mind-dependent
featureof space. Because
metric,
there
are
no
natural
is
unitsofspace.We adopt
divisible,
space infinitely
it
a
as
andourtreatment
someconventional
of
standard,
length,
treating
itas suchinvolvesregarding
itas 'undividedinperception'
(Metaphysics
theactivity
ofpercipient
1053a23).So without
agentslikeourselveswith
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and interests,
therewouldbe no non-trivial
certainintentions
answerto
thequestion'Whatis thedistancebetweenobjectsa and bVThus,not
onlyis distancean evidentproperfeatureof space (somethingone
he perceivesa spatialinterval
as such),
cannotfailtoperceivewhenever
itsveryexistence
dependsinpartuponactsofperception.
ButgiventhefactthatAristotle
envisionschange(rather,
locomotion,
toPhysics
theparadigmatic
260a27-9)as being
typeofchange,according
he mustimaginethatthereis some
parasiticupon spatialintervals,
to
distance.
That's
ofchange
kinetic
justwhattimeis:themetric
analogue
'a
of
number
The
it,
(arithmos
(or as Aristotle
kinêséõs)').
puts
change
I
not
to
be
taken
Aristotle's
is
as
understand
is
view,
it,
lightly.
analogy
thatdistancestandsto space inprecisely
thesamewaythattimestands
tochange.Thisexplainsboththeabundanceofperception-talk
longafter
A
and
B
set
out
and
his
remark
have
been
about
the
possiArguments
bilityofchangewithouttimein IV 14.29
ofPhilosophy
Department
BoiseStateUniversity
1910University
Drive
Boise,ID 83725-1550
U.S.A.
troark@boisestate.edu

to SylviaBerryman,
S. MarcCohen,Jim
29 I wishto extendmysinceregratitude
on earlierdrafts
ofthis
and David Sedleyfortheirgraciouscomments
Hankinson,
paper.

